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Abstract
We consider an overlapping generations model in which public
spending directly contributes to grow up productivity as Barro (1990)
and a government comforts the constant spending-GDP and debt-
spending ratio rules. We analyse policy eects on scal sustainability,
growth rate and welfare. This paper gives some remarks as follows:
First, we demonstrate that when spending-GDP ratio rises it may be
more sustainable scal policy. Second, we show analytically that if
higher spending-GDP ratio is more sustainable scal policy, it brings
higher growth rate in both short-term and long-term. Third, such
policy change is Pareto improving. These remarks are not obtained in
previous researches on scal sustainability.
Key Words: scal sustainability, productive government spending, public
debt, endogenous growth
JEL Classication: E62, H54, H63
1 Introduction
We consider an economy where public spending directly contributes to
grow up productivity and investigate what type of scal policy is sustain-
able and how change of scal policy aects the economy. We analyse policy
eects on scal sustainability, growth rate and welfare and obtain some
dierent remarks in comparison with previous works. We demonstrate it
with analytical and numerical methods in what follows.
The relation between productive public spending and economic growth
is analysed in many papers. Barro (1990) considers the case where public
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spending is used to raise productivity, directly, and shows the inverse U
shaped relationship between public spending-GDP ratio and growth rate.
Futagami et al. (1993) considers the case where public capital investment
raises it and analyses the same as Barro (1990). However, these papers
investigate only the situation in which the government follows balanced-
budget rule and do not take account into public debt.
In recent years, scal sustainability has been analysed by some papers,
which assume that the government can issue public debt under some scal
policy rules, and analyses whether stock of public debt diverges or not in an
overlapping generations model. Chalk (2000) and Rankin and Roa (2003)
suppose that public spending is xed and check the condition acheiving
scal sustainability in exogenous growth OLG models. Brau¨ninger (2005)
also analyses the issue in OLG model including endogenous growth in
which the government conforms constant public spending-GDP ratio and
public debt-GDP ratio rules. In these papers, increasing in spending or
issurance of public debt leads to less sustainability of scal policy and, in
addition, Brau¨ninger (2005) says that it makes growth rate lower.
Futhermore, Yakita (2008) tackles the analysis of scal sustainability
when the government expenditure is productive through investiment of
public capital and follows the scal policy rules as Brau¨ninger (2005). The
eect of public spending has not been considered in preceding researches
of scal sustainability as above. He concludes that i) increasing in public
spending-GDP ratio or public debt-GDP ratio leads to less scal sustainabil-
ity, and ii) increasing in debt-GDP ratio declines growth rate but increasing
in spending-GDP ratio may raise.
However, he assumes that the government invests no-depreciate public
capital, which corresponds to the situation of Futagami et al. (1993). We
focus on the situation corresponding to Barro (1990). In other words, we
suppose that public spending directly grows productibity and the govern-
ment follows the scal policy rules used in Brau¨ninger (2005) and Yakita
(2008), and investigate policy eects on scal sustainability and economic
growth.
We obtain following main remarks in this paper: i) if spending-GDP
ratio is small, increasing in the ratio brings more scal sustainability, ii) if
higher spending-GDP ratio improves scal sustainability, it makes growth
rate higher, iii) when raising spending-GDP ratio gives more scal sustain-
ability, such policy change is Pareto improving.
First remark is dierent one in contrast to previous studies on scal
sustainability as above. Good policy eect for sustainability tends to oc-
cur when public spending-GDP ratio is small, as we will see. In other
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words, there is non-monotonic, inverse-U shape relationship between pub-
lic spending and scal sustainability in our model, which was not obtained
in the previous researches. The reason is that productivity depends on
concave function of public spending-GDP ratio. Hence, when the ratio
increases, if the ratio is suciently small then outputs suciently enlarges
and its eect is dominated the eect of costs of increasing in public spend-
ing. This implies that we have to check not only the amount of public debt
but also public spending-GDP ratio in order to attain scal sustainability
by some policy change.
Second remark corresponds to the conclusion of Barro (1990), which
shows the inverse U-shape relationship between spending-GDP ratio and
growth rate. In previous studies of scal sustainability, this relationship
was not obtained and the relationship considerably aects our remarks.
Third remark is also divergent from the remark of preceding works.
There are a few researches which analyses the welfare eect by change of
scal policy rules. Futagami and Shibata (2003) shows that any change
of public spending cannot Pareto improve in an endogenous growth OLG
model 1). However, our paper shows that change of public spending policy
can improve welfare of all generations, when the policy change leads to
more scal sustainability.
The rest of this paper consists as follows: Section 2 gives framework
of model, shows the existence of balanced growth path steady state and
illustrates dynamics of public debt. Section 3 derives the policy eects on
scal sustainability and growth rate. Finally, section 4 is conclusion.
2 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations model which consists of individ-
uals, rms and the government.
Individuals live for two periods. The size of each generations is same,
which is normalized to unity. Individuals which are born at t = 0; 1; 2;   
has identical utility function as below,
ln cyt +  ln c
o
t+1 (1)
where cyt is consumption when they are young, c
o
t+1 is when old and  2
(0; 1) is subjective discount rate. When indiviuals are young, they supply
1)Note that they suppose that the government comforms dierent scal policy rules from
the previous works as above which are constant public spending-capital and tax-capital
ratio.
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their own labor inelastically, receive wage and consume or save it. On
the one hand, when old, they unpile their saving. There are no bequests.
Each household maximizes its own utility subject to intertemporal budget
constraint.
Firms product goods in perfect competitivemarket. They have identical
production technology,
yt = Akt (gtlt)
1  (2)
whereA is technological parameter (constant), kt is stock of physical capital,
gt is the size of the government expenditure and lt is unit of labor. Firms
aim to maximize their prot in perfect competitive market and then we can
write down the rm's prot maximization problem as
max
kt;lt
t = yt   rtkt   wtlt: (3)
The government spends on public expenditure to raise productivity of
labor. It is nanced by at-rate income tax or issuance of public debt.
bt+1 = (1 + Rt)bt + gt   Tt
Tt = t[rtst 1 + wt]
(4)
wherewedenote bt as the stock of public debt at initial of period t,Rt interest
rate of public debt, and Tt total tax revenue. We assume that government
conforms the scal policy rules as follows,
gt = yt (5)
bt+1   bt = gt: (6)
where ;  2 [0; 1] are policy parameters. Equation (5) means that the gov-
ernment xes the ratio of public spending to GDP and equation (6) says
that public debt is issued with constant proportion to government expen-
diture. These scal rules are used in many previous works, Brau¨ninger
(2005), Yakita (2008) and so on.
Then we dene competitive equilibrium and consider the path only
which attains the equilibrium in every period.
Denition 1 (competitive equilibrium). The sequences of predetermined vari-
ables fkt; btg1t=0 and price system frt;Rt;wtg1t=0 are competitive equlibrium if, for
any t, they satisfy the following conditions:
1. Household's utility maximization conditions,
st =

1 + 
(1   t)wt: (7)
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2. Firm's prot maximization conditions,
rt = Ak 1t g
1 
t (8)
wt = (1   )Akt g1 t : (9)
3. The government's budget constraint, (4), and the scal policy rules, (5) and
(6).
4. No-arbitrage condition,
(1   t)Rt = (1   t)rt: , Rt = rt (10)
5. Capital market clearing condition,
st = kt+1 + bt+1: (11)
6. Labor market clearing condition,
lt = 1: (12)
Furthermore, we denote the balanced growth path steady state as below.
Denition 2 (Balanced growth path steady state). The sequences of predeter-
mined variables fkt; btg1t=0 and price system frt;Rt;wtg1t=0 are balanced growth
path steady state (BGP) if they are competitive equilibrium and if there exists
some  such that for any t,
kt+1
kt
=
bt+1
bt
= : (13)
Dening bt := bt=kt, we can write down the dynamic system 2) as
bt+1
bt
:=
bt+1=bt
kt+1=kt
=
1 + b 1t A
1=1=

1+
1+ 
1+bt
A1=1= 1(1   )   bt   A1=1=
: (14)
By the denition, it is equivalent for the BGP that bt = 1.
We investigate the condition for sustainable scal policy. The govern-
ment's scal policy is represented as the set of policy parameters, (; ) and
it is sustainable scal policy if there exists BGP in this system, bt+1=bt = 1
because, when the system has BGP, debt-capital ratio can converge for some
appropriate initial stocks of debt and capital, which is shown in section 2.1.
Lemma 1 is preparation and Proposition 1 tells what kind of scal policy is
sustainable.
2)We show the derivation of equation (14) in Appendix.
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Lemma 1. If A is sucient large, there exists MIN and MAX such that  2
[MIN; MAX] is equivalent to exist BGP for some . 3).
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 1. Given suciently large A such that MIN and MAX exist, and
xed  2 [MIN; MAX], there exists a critical value of  to garantee the existence
of BGP. Furthermore, i) if  is smaller than critical one, the system has two BGPs.
ii) if  equals, has only one BGP. iii) if  is larger, has no BGP.
Proof. Dene the functions,  and	;
(b;) =

1 + 
1 +    
1 + bt
A1=1= 1(1   )   A1=1=; (15)
	(b;) = 1 + A1=1= b 1t + b: (16)
 and	 satisfy the properties,
(0) 2 (0;1); lim
b!0
	(b) = +1; lim
b!1
(b) < 0; lim
b!1
	(b) = +1: (17)
We obtain @=@ < 0 and @	=@ > 0 and so that the larger  we choose,
the more BGPs become nonexistent 4). This is all of the proof. 
Figure.1 illsurates whether there are BGPs or not. When  is lower,
graph of  lies upside and 	 downside and then BGPs tend to exist. If
higher  is chosen,  moves downward and 	 up over and then BGPs
become nonexistent.
We aim to investigate what kind of scal policy is sustainable. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the range of the sustainable scal policy parameters with
 = 0:2;  = 0:55 and A = 12. These parameters are the same as Brau¨ninger
(2005) 5). In Figure 2, downside region of the dotted line represents sus-
tainable policy in the economy considered by Brau¨ninger (2005) in which
public spending is nonproductive and wasted. On the other hand, down-
side of the solid line indicates sustainable one in our model, where public
spending is productive.
4)Strictly speaking, we can prove this with the saddle-note bifurcation theorem. See
Devaney (2003), for example.
5)Here, wewant to compare the set of policy parameterswhich attains scal sustainability,
and then, we adopt the same parameters as Brau¨ninger (2005) and do not consider whether
these parameters are plausible or not in our model. In following part, we set the plausible
parameters again.
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b
;	
 with higher 
 with lower 
	with lower 
	with higher 
Figure 1: Exsitence of BGPs.
We can intuitively interpret the set of parameters of sustainable scal
policy as follows. First, we demonstrate why spending-GDP ratio, , must
be moderate for scal sustainability. If  is too small, marginal productivity
is insucient and it negatively aects scal sustainability. On the other
hand, if  is much higher, the `cost', which contains of tax-rate and issur-
ance of public debt, becomes toomuch higher and it worsens sustainability.
These facts corresponds to Barro (1990), which shows the inverse U-shape
relationship between spending-GDP ratio and growth rate. Second, we
explain the relationship between debt-spending ratio  and scal sustain-
ability. When the government adopts higher , the government issues so
much more public debt that the payment of interest of public debt grows
and private capital is crowded out in long-term. This means that the higher
 the government chooses, the less scal sustainability the economy attains.
The gure implies that our model derives that increasing in may lead
good eects on sustainability and when  is relatively small, which is not
appeared in previous researches about scal sustainability. The upward
sloping graph in the left side area of Figure 2 means that scal policy with
higher  is more sustainable, because raising  worsens sustainability as
shown. We will show the insight at the section of policy eect.
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Figure 2: The range of the sustainable scal policy parameters. Downside
of the line illustrates the area of sustainable scal policy, (; ). [Solid line:
productive public spending, Dotted line: wasteful public spending.]
2.1 Stability of BGP
Next, we check the stability of BGP. We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When there exists two BGPs, one BGP with smaller b is stable
and the other with larger b unstable.
Proof. By denition of  and	, we get that
bt+1
bt
8>><>>: 1< 1 ()
8>><>>:(bt)  	(bt)(bt) > 	(bt): (18)
Therefore, Figure. 3 shows the statement. 
Proposition 2 tells that gure 3 illustrates that initial ratio of public debt
to capital, b0, inuences the sustainability. Let the ratio at stable BGP be bS
and at unstable one be bU, respectively. From Figure 3, if b0  bU then bt
converges to bS (or continues to stay bU). On the other hand, if b0 > bU then
bt diverses and this means that such scal policy is unsustainable. This
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b
;	
	

stable BGP unstable BGP
Figure 3: The stability of BGP when there exists two BGPs.
remark implies that it is important for scal sustainability that not only
policy parameters but also initial stock of public debt. It is consistent for
other previous researches.
3 Policy Eect
In this section, we analyse the eect of change of scal policy. Concretely,
we will investigate the eects on scal sustainability and growth rate when
the government changes policy parameters,  and .
Policy Eect on Sustainability
We have already analysed the policy eect on sustainability when the gov-
ernment changes . From Prosition 1, the larger  the government chooses,
the more BGPs become nonexistent. Intuitively, increasing  brings that
public debt growth rate rises and capital is crowded out, so that there rarely
tends to exist BGPs.
When the government changes  under constant , policy eect on
sustainability may not be the same as the case where changes . To analyse
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it, we dierentiate  = 	 and obtain
db
d
=
  	
 b +	b
: (19)
where x, and 	x, is partial dierentiation of , and 	, with respect to x,
respectively. Equation (19) tells how changing  (with xed ) aects b at
BGP. The sign of denominator of (19) is decided by whether BGP is stable
or unstable; if b is the level at unstable BGP then  b +	b > 0. The sign of
numerator of (19) is calculated as
  	 = A1=1= 1
"

1 + 
(1   ) (1=   1)
 1   1=(1   )
(1 + bt)
  

(b 1t + 1)
#
:
(20)
and so that if (20) is positive, increasing in  gives more sustainable scal
policy in the sense that that the range of initial debt-capital ratio which
achieves scal sustainability widens 6). (20) can be positive when  is small.
However, it is hard for us to obtain analytical remark on @b=@ and hence
we take the numerical example of the sign of @b=@. Figure 4 illustrates the
relationship between debt-spending ratio and b at stable BGP.
Wecalculatewith thedeepparameterswhich areA = 4, = 0:2,  = 0:55 and
policy parameter,  = 0:01. We can observe the non-monotonic relationship
between  and b at stable BGP. This was not be got in previous works on
scal sustainability.
We consider the reasonwhy thenon-monotonic relationship arises. Sup-
pose that spending-GDP ratio is much small. The situation means that
increasing in public spending-GDP ratio drastically raises interest rate and
wage rate through ascenting . This eect dominates the other eects of
public costs, raising tax rate and/or more issurance of public debt, and the
eect yields net benets. Therefore, when  is much small, raising  leads
to more scal sustainability. Inversely, if spending-GDP ratio is relatively
large, when the government enlarges , the eects of costs dominates the
eect of marginal productivity. Then enlarging  brings less sustainable
scal policy.
Policy Eect on Growth Rate
Next, we analyse the policy eect on growth rate. Concretely, when we
change  or , how does it make eect on growth rate.
6)The reason is that debt-capital ratio at unstable BGPmeans the upper bound of sustain-
able initial debt-capital ratio.
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Figure 4: The relation between b at stable BGP and .
Gross growth rate of GDP is represented as those of capital 7),
yt+1
yt
=
kt+1
kt
=

1 + 
1 +    
1 + bt
A1=1= 1(1   )   bt   A1=1=: (21)
Hence, we can obtain the growth rate by equation (21).
At rst, we investigate the policy eect when change  with xed .
7)This is lead because public spending per GDP is constant from the scal policy rule. If
the policy rules is changed, this may not be held.
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Change of  leads to alter growth rate at stable BGP as
@
@
= A1=1= 1
"

1 + 
(1   ) (1=   1)
 1   1=(1   )
1 + bt
  

#
 
"

1 + 
1   (1   )
(1 + bt)2
A1=1= 1(1   ) + 1
#
@b
@
(22)
If @b=@ is negative, the rst term of equation (22) is positive 8) and so that
@=@ also is. However, if @b=@ is positive, the rst term of equation (22)
may be positive or negative. Then the growth rate on the ratio of public
spending to GDP cannot be determined analytically.
Proposition 3. If debt-capital ratio at stable BGP decreases when spending-GDP
ratio raises (and debt-spending ratio is xed), growth rate increases in both short-
term and long-term.
The reason why positive growth eect is generated by raising  is that
much aects labor productivity. Suppose that the government alters  to
higher and it makes debt-spending ratio low at stable BGP. This generates
three eects: raising wage, income tax-rate and interest rate in short-term.
When higher  leads to more scal sustainablility, the eect of income tax
rate is dominated by the others and so that raising  brings household's
saving in short-term. In addition, in long-term, growth rate of capital rises
because bt gets smaller to b at new stable BGP level and it declines the
amount of roll over and the payment of interest of public debt. As the
result, we hold proposition 3.
However, if larger  means less sustainable scal policy, we cannot
guarantee holding the same remark, that is, larger  can make growth rate
lower. We take a numerical examples to demonstrate it. Figure 5 illustrates
the relation between growth rate and the ratio of public spending to GDP.
We set the policy parameters as  = 0:01.
Next, we investigate the policy eect when the government changes 
with xed . The growth rate at BGP is represented by (21),
@
@
= A1=1=
"

1 + 
1   
1 + b
  1
#
 
"

1 + 
1   (1   )
(1 + bt)2
A1=1= 1(1   ) + 1
#
@b
@
(23)
where  is the growth rate at BGP. Then @=@ < 0 at stable BGP because
@b=@ > 0 at stable. This tells that growth rate is decreased in long-term
8)See the subsection of policy eects on sustainability.
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Figure 5: The relation between growth rate at stable BGP and .
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when the ratio of the government debt to public spending is increased
with constant spending-GDP ratio. Growth rate is also reduced even in
short-term.
The reason of change of growth rate is as follows: Suppose that the
economy is at BGP at initial period and consider the case where the gov-
ernment chooses larger . Household's saving increases from tax-cut but
issuance of public debt in next period increases more. Therefore private
capitals are crowded out in next period and growth rate descends in short-
term. Furthermore b at new stable BGP grows up and growth rate goes
down in long-term, because of less saving from tax-raise and crowding out
of private capital 9).
Pareto Improving Policy Change
Though raising  brings more scal sustainability and higher growth rate
if  is rather small as previous part, this does not mean directly that such
policy change is Pareto improving. Increasing in  has four channels as we
have seen in previous section: it changes interest rate, wage rate, income tax
rate and debt-capital ratio. We analyse welfare eect through them when
scal policy rule changes in follows.
Household's born at t has the indirect utility, Vt, which is derived as
Vt := (1   ) ln 11 +  +  ln  + (1 + ) ln
"
1   (1   )
(1 + bt)
(1   )A1=1= 1
#
+ (1 + ) ln kt +  ln
"
1 +
1   (1   )
(1 + bt+1)
A1=1= 1
#
(24)
Note that for initial stocks of capital, k0, we can write kt =
Qt 1
i=0 ik0 where
kt is capital growth rate, that is,
kt := kt+1=kt =

1 + 
1   (1   )
1 + bt
A1=1= 1(1   )   bt   A1=1=: (25)
Suppose that the government announces and sets  to higher at period
t = T and such policy change brings more scal sustainability. We will
consider the welfare eect of change of  in follows. At rst, check the
welfare of household born at period T 1. bT and kT are already determined
and then its welfare is aected through change of interest rate and income
tax rate. We can show that the impact of interest is larger than of income tax
9)From Firure 3, we can show that bt grows up to new stable BGP on a transition path.
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because we hold @[(1   T)rT]=@ > 0 10) . In other words, raising  makes
current generation household happier. Second, the welfare of household
born at T depends on not only the same channel as above but also change
of wage and growth rate. Nontheless, we obtain the remark that household
born at period T improves its welfare because raising  leads growth rate
to higher, which is shown by proposition 3, and we hold bt  bT for all
t > T by our suppostition. Hence, its welfare must rise by increasing in
. Furthermore, we can show that households born after period T + 1
improve their welfare in similar way. As a result, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. If raising spending-GDP ratio brings more sustainable scal pol-
icy, such policy change is Pareto improving.
Proof. See Appendix C 
However, when raising  brings less scal sustainability, we cannot
decide the sign of welfare eect analytically even in short-term. In short-
term, there are opposite eects through between interest and/or wage rate
and income tax rate and, hence, welfare eect may be positive or negative.
Additionally, in long-term, bt increases and converges to b which is debt-
capital ratio at `new' stable BGP. Hence, in general, the government cannot
attain Pareto improving by scal policy change 11).
4 Conclusion
We construct a overlapping generationsmodel inwhich the government ex-
pendituresproductivepublic spendingandcomforts the constant spending-
GDP and debt-spending rules, and then analyse the policy eects on scal
sustainability, growth rate and welfare of households which belongs each
generations.
In this model, we obtain three analytical remarks as follows: i) when
spending-GDP ratio is small, raising the ratio brings more sustainable scal
10)This partial dierentiation is equivalent for rst term of equation (20) and it must be
positive if @b=@ > 0 at unstable BGP.
11)When the government alters , it is obvious that this policy change cannot attain Pareto
improving. The reason is that raising improveswelfare of current generation,which occurs
through cutting income, tax but worsens welfare of future generations, which generates
through lowering growth rate and increaseing in payment of interest of public debt by
increase in bt.
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policy, ii) if raising spending-GDP ratio leads to more scal sustainabil-
ity, increasing in the ratio makes growth rate higher, and iii) if increasing
in spending-GDP ratio gives more sustaianble scal regime, such policy
change is Pareto improving. In sum, Our contribution is that we reveal
the new relationship between spending-GDP ratio and scal sustainabil-
ity. These remarks depends on the assumption which is that government
spending directly and instantenously grows marginal productivity, rather
than through accumulation of public capital.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
We prove lemma 1 in Appendix A.
Proof. We prove the statement by following steps.
1. Fix a policy (; ). If there exists BGPs in the system, we have

1 + 
(1   )A1=1= 1(1   ) > 1: (26)
2. If  satises (26), there exists some BGP for some  > 0.
3. if A is suciently large, there exists which satises (26).
We can show easily the statment of last step and hence we give the proof of
the rst and second statements.
Proof of rst statement: Fix (; ) and, by assumption, we have some b
such that

1 + 
(1  )A1=1= 1 1   (1   )
1 + b
  A1=1= = 1+ b+ A1=1= b 1:
(27)
The left side of (27) is decreasing in  and b. Hence,

1 + 
(1 )A1=1= 1 1   (1   )
1 + b
 A1=1= < 
1 + 
(1 )A1=1= 1(1 ):
(28)
As the same way, we have on the right side of (27),
1 + b + A1=1= b 1 > 1: (29)
Combining the two inequlities, we obtain equation (27).
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Proof of second statement: Fix  which satises (??). Then we can denote
 > 0 as
 :=

1 + 
(1   )A1=1= 1(1   )   1 > 0: (30)
We want to show that equation (27) has solution(s) for  if some small
. Dierence between the left hand and right hand of (27) is calculated
with  as
1 + 
1 + bt
  (1 + bt)   A1=1=
"

1 + 
(1   ) 1
1 + bt
  (1 + b 1t )
#
: (31)
It is obvious that if  is adequately small, the dierence can be zero
for some bt, which means that there exists BGPs for some  which
satises (27) and .

B Derivation of Equations (14)
In this section, we give an explanation how to obtain equation (14).
First, we compute (1   t). Total tax revenue, Tt, is
Tt = t (rtst 1 + wt) = t(yt + rtbt) (32)
from equations (8), (9) and (11). Then the government's budget constraint,
(4), and policy rules, (5) and (6), leads to
yt = rtbt + yt   t(yt + rtbt): (33)
We solve the equation (33) for t and obtain
1   t = 1 +    
1 + bt
: (34)
Second,we calculate kt+1=kt and bt+1=bt. kt+1=kt is derivedby substitution
equations (7), (34) and (6) to (11) as
kt+1
kt
=

1 + 
1 +    
1 + bt=kt
A1=1= 1(1   )   bt
kt
  A1=1=: (35)
And we obtain bt+1=bt from equation (6),
bt+1
bt
= 1 + 
 
bt
kt
! 1
A1=1= (36)
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Finally, combining (35) and (36), we get equation (14),
bt+1=bt
kt+1=kt
=
bt+1
bt
=
1 + b 1t A
1=1=

1+
1+ 
1+bt
A1=1= 1(1   )   bt   A1=1=
: (37)
C Proof of Proposition 4
In this section, we give the proof of Proposition 4 as below.
Proof. Suppose that government xes , raises  suddenly at period t =
T, and this policy change gives more sustainable scal policy. We show
Proposition 4 by following three steps.
Step1 Welfare of household born at t = T   1 can improve by this policy
change.
Step2 Welfare of household born at t = T can improve .
Step3 Welfare of household born after t = T + 1 can improve.
Proof of Step1.
The indirect utility of household born at T   1 is given as,
VT 1 := (1   ) ln 11 +  +  ln  + (1 + ) ln
"
1   (1   )
(1 + bT 1)
(1   )A1=1= 1
#
+ (1 + ) ln kT 1 +  ln
"
1 +
1   (1   )
(1 + bT)
A1=1= 1
#
(38)
The household takes bT 1, kT 1 and bT as given because they are predeter-
mined. Therefore, when the policy change arises at period T, we have
dVT 1
d
=
d
d
ln
"
1 +
1   (1   )
(1 + bT)
(1   )A1=1= 1
#
> 0: (39)
This inequlity is held because of the assumption that the policy change
brings more scal sustainability 12).
12)To check this, see equation (19) and (??). It is obvious that if the above inequlity is not
held, raising must make scal sustainability worse.
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Proof of Step2.
The indirect utility of household born at T is got as,
VT := (1   ) ln 11 +  +  ln  + (1 + ) ln
"
1   (1   )
(1 + bT)
(1   )A1=1= 1
#
+ (1 + ) ln kT +  ln
"
1 +
1   (1   )
(1 + bT+1)
A1=1= 1
#
(40)
The household takes bT and kT as given. However, bT+1 can alter by the
policy change. Then, marginal change of the indirect utility is led as
dVT
d
=
@
@
ln
"
1 +
1   (1   )
(1 + bT+1)
(1   )A1=1= 1
#
: (41)
We hold @bT+1=@ > 0 and @=@[(1 (1 ))1= 1] > 0 becausewe suppose
that the policy change brings more sustainable scal policy. Hence, we get
dVT=d > 0.
Proof of Step3.
To prove Proposition 4, we have only to show that the welfare of household
born at T+ 1 can improve 13). The indirect utility of household born at T+ 1
is as follow.
VT+1 := (1   ) ln 11 +  +  ln  + (1 + ) ln
"
1   (1   )
(1 + bT)
(1   )A1=1= 1
#
+ (1 + ) ln kT+1 +  ln
"
1 +
1   (1   )
(1 + bT+1)
A1=1= 1
#
(42)
By the discussion in the proof of step1 and 2, the third and last term of (42)
is increasing in . Then we aim to show dkT+1=d > 0. We rewrite kT+1 as
below,
kT+1 = kTkT =
"

1 + 
1   (1   )
1 + bT
A1=1= 1(1   )   bT   A1=1=
#
kT:
(43)
13)As the sameway, we can show that thewelfare of household born afterT+2 can improve
by the policy change.
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where bT and kT are given. Therefore,
dkT+1
d
= [  	]kT > 0: (44)
The inequlity is held because the policy change brings more scal sustain-
ability. 
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